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The Governing Dynamics of State 
Marijuana Legislation: Game Theory and 
the Need for Interstate Cooperation 
Adam R. Scott* 
ABSTRACT 
 
Social views evolve over time, but lasting societal change requires 
affirmative and strategic action. In modern American society, one social 
issue that requires strategic action is the legalization of marijuana through 
state legislation. Disagreements between state and federal law are common 
in a federal governmental structure. However, the individualized nature of 
state marijuana legislation and unpredictable federal prosecutorial 
discretion present novel legal issues that must be proactively addressed.  
Since 1970, the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”) has categorized 
marijuana as a “Schedule I” drug. Despite the unwavering criminalization 
of marijuana under federal law, thirty-three states and the District of 
Columbia now legally permit marijuana use in at least one form. 
Consequently, the use and possession of marijuana is no longer a binary 
issue of right or wrong. Instead, state marijuana legislation now raises new 
social and legal concerns impacting all federal and state governments.  
 
*  J.D. Candidate, The Pennsylvania State University, Penn State Law, 2020. Thank 
you to everyone who offered their love, support, and guidance throughout this journey. I 
hope this Comment inspires thoughtful and productive discussions in the future. Never 
settle for the status quo. 
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Importantly, this Comment does not endorse a specific position on 
the use or possession of marijuana, nor does it offer a new solution that 
will “fix” the issue overnight. Instead, this Comment utilizes existing 
scholarship to illustrate how economic game theory principles can produce 
new insights and strategies regarding marijuana legalization in America. 
More specifically, this Comment uses the Prisoner’s Dilemma game to 
evaluate state marijuana legislation and to explain how increased interstate 
collaboration can mitigate the uncertainty created by unchecked 
federalism and prosecutorial discretion. Above all, readers should 
critically consider how game theory principles can help address other 
complex social issues in the future. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Complex social issues often demand gradual change and strategic 
cooperation, not quick and straightforward solutions.1 When complex 
social issues are not promptly addressed, growing tensions can lead to 
 
1. See Dietrich Dorner & Joachim Funke, Complex Problem Solving: What It Is and 
What It Is Not, FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., July 11, 2017, at 1. 
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selfish choices that undermine basic democratic goals and values.2 One 
modern example of this phenomenon is the growth of states legalizing the 
use and possession of marijuana in contradiction to federal criminal law.3 
Conflict between state and federal law is not novel in the American federal 
system.4 Nonetheless, the complex nature of modern state marijuana 
legislation raises important questions that must be addressed, especially 
the role of federalism and the limits of constitutional power in American 
society.5  
The modern conflict between federal law and state marijuana 
legislation is also well-documented by academics and legal practitioners 
alike.6 The legalization of marijuana is also a socially divisive topic.7 
Consequently, this Comment does not endeavor to contradict past 
scholarship, nor does it claim to provide a universal solution that will “fix” 
current disagreements between state and federal law.8 Instead, this 
Comment uses game theory to offer new perspectives and practical tools 
to address the intersecting of federalism, prosecutorial discretion, and state 
marijuana legislation.9 More specifically, this Comment uses the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game to illustrate how interstate collaboration can 
revitalize traditional notions of federalism and eventually decrease 
tensions caused by individualized and conflicting state marijuana laws.10 
This Comment also aspires to provide a new evaluative framework that 
 
2. See, e.g., Kevin Arceneaux, Does Federalism Weaken Democratic Representation 
in the United States?, 35 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 297, 299–301 (2005) (discussing the 
important role citizens play in federal society, especially when confronted with the historic 
question concerning “the amount of authority that should belong to the national 
government”); Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt, How a Democracy Dies, NEW REPUBLIC 
(Dec. 7, 2017), https://bit.ly/31O3qvn (noting that democracies work best when 
“constitutions are reinforced by norms of mutual toleration and restraint in the exercise of 
power”). 
3. See infra Section II.B. 
4. For the purposes of this paper, the legalization of marijuana through state 
legislation will be referred to as “state marijuana legislation.” For more information on 
American federalism, see infra Section II.A. 
5. See infra Section II.A. 
6. See, e.g., TODD GARVEY & BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43034, STATE 
LEGALIZATION OF RECREATIONAL MARIJUANA: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1–5 (2014); TODD 
GARVEY, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42398, MEDICAL MARIJUANA: THE SUPREMACY 
CLAUSE, FEDERALISM, AND THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL LAWS 1, 7–11 
(2012); Erwin Chemerinsky, Marijuana Laws and Federalism, 58 B.C. L. REV. 857, 857–
62 (2018); Erwin Chemerinsky et al., Cooperative Federalism and Marijuana Regulation, 
62 UCLA L. REV. 74, 77 (2015) (“The ongoing clash over marijuana laws raises questions 
of tension and cooperation between state and federal governments and forces policymakers 
and courts to address the preemptive power of federal drug laws. Divergent federal and 
state laws also create debilitating instability and uncertainty on the ground in those states 
that are pioneering new approaches to marijuana control.”). 
7. See infra Section II.B. 
8. See infra Section II.B; see also infra Part III. 
9. See infra Parts II–III. 
10. See infra Sections II.B–.C. 
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can be used to understand and address other complex social issues in the 
future.11 
I. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS 
Marijuana use and regulation are not new issues in American 
society.12 For over fifty years, the utility and legality of marijuana have 
remained virtually unchanged under federal law.13 Conversely, social 
views have evolved quite drastically during the past half-century.14 Today, 
two questions warrant consideration: (1) what caused the modern disparity 
between state and federal marijuana law; and (2) what can be done to 
alleviate current tensions and promote state and federal cooperation in the 
future?15  
A. The Basics of American Federalism 
Federal law officially criminalized the use and possession of 
marijuana in 1970.16 Yet after thirty years of social protest, California was 
the first state to contradict federal law and legalize marijuana use for 
medicinal purposes.17 More importantly, California’s marijuana 
legislation created a ripple effect that has led to the passage of marijuana-
related state legislation in 33 states and the District of Columbia.18 As 
public support for state marijuana legislation grows, state legislators must 
grapple with the role of federalism, the boundaries of constitutional law, 
and whether the power to legalize marijuana rests with the states or the 
federal government.19 
 
11. See infra Part III. 
12. See infra Section II.B.1. 
13. See infra Section II.B.2. 
14. See infra Section II.B.3.  
15. See infra Parts II–III. 
16. See infra Sections II.B.1–.2. 
17. See Dean M. Nickles, Note, Federalism and State Marijuana Legislation, 91 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1253, 1254 (2016) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 
(West 2014)). 
18. See infra Section II.B.3; see also Keith Speights, Timeline for Marijuana 
Legalization in the United States: How the Dominoes Are Falling, MOTLEY FOOL (Jan. 2, 
2020, 1:06 PM), https://bit.ly/2SfM9Xk; cf. JONATHAN P. CAULKINS ET AL., CONSIDERING 
MARIJUANA LEGISLATION: INSIGHTS FOR VERMONT AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 2–5 (2015), 
https://bit.ly/2vzgfNR (summarizing marijuana-related changes in public sentiment across 
U.S. states, as well as reasons why state marijuana legislation is now the subject of serious 
social and political debate). 
19. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 15–18, 28–29 (2005) (declaring that 
Congress has the legal and constitutional authority to regulate marijuana through 
preemptive federal law (first citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (Commerce Clause); and 
then citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause)); Lea Brilmayer, A General 
Theory of Preemption: With Comments on State Decriminalization of Marijuana, 58 B.C. 
L. REV. 895, 921–23 (2017) (comparing the jurisdictional overlap of the federal system and 
individual state government systems); Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 859 (“No state is 
required to have a law prohibiting or regulating marijuana. Indeed, it would violate the 
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1. The Basic Objectives of Federalism 
The term “federalism” refers to the institutional “division of [shared] 
authority” between individual state governments and the United States 
federal government.20 Although the term “federalism” never appears in the 
United States Constitution (“Constitution”),21 the concept of federalism is 
a foundational principle of American society.22 Federalism remains a 
relevant topic of modern society because the scope of federal power is a 
question that “perpetually aris[es], and will probably continue to arise, as 
long as our system shall exist.”23 
Federalism is not a passive political theory.24 Federalism is a practical 
tool that can help resolve issues within individual states and create unity 
amongst otherwise independent states.25 Federalism can also galvanize 
broad social change by allowing individual states to develop experimental 
solutions to local problems, which can later be adopted nationwide.26 
 
Tenth Amendment for Congress to compel states to have and enforce laws prohibiting 
possession of marijuana. . . . The more difficult arising issue is whether states, by legalizing 
marijuana and then regulating and taxing it, are impeding the federal government from 
achieving its goals in making marijuana a Schedule I controlled substance.”). 
20. See Robert Longley, What Is Federalism? Definition and How It Works in the 
US, THOUGHTCO. (Aug. 3, 2018), https://bit.ly/2sZi2uV; see also George Charles Roche 
III, American Federalism: Origins, FOUND. FOR ECON. EDUC. (Dec. 1, 1966), 
https://bit.ly/2zrVBxB. 
21. See Linda R. Monk, Federalism, PBS.ORG, https://to.pbs.org/2F018Bm (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2020); see also Martin Diamond, The Ends of Federalism, 3 PUBLIUS: J. 
FEDERALISM 129, 130–37 (1973) (discussing the historic evolution of federalism and its 
role in American society). 
22. See Monk, supra note 21 (discussing the underlying American theme of “E 
Pluribus Unum,” which means “out of many states, one nation”); see also THE FEDERALIST 
NO. 39 (James Madison) (“The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, . . . neither a national 
nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.”). 
23. Monk, supra note 21 (quoting M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 (1819) 
(opinion of Marshall, C.J.)). 
24. See Robert A. Shapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 243, 272 (2005) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison) (discussing that 
states serve as valuable guardians of the people’s liberties . . . [and] protect citizens from 
the overwhelming power of the national government.”)).  
25. See Colin Roth, Marijuana Legislation Is Federalism in Action, WASH. 
EXAMINER (July 2, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://washex.am/36x4KDL (arguing that Clinton-
era federalism “changed welfare from permanent dependency to a program that assists 
needy families while incentivizing reentry into the workforce”); see also Katie Tubb, How 
Federalism Is Making a Difference on Western Lands, HERITAGE FOUND. (Aug. 21, 2019) 
https://herit.ag/37EuKhM (explaining that states are best placed to manage local 
environmental issues, rather than relying on federal agencies to offer “blanket solutions to 
nuanced problems”). But see Pietro S. Nivola, Why Federalism Matters, BROOKINGS (Oct. 
1, 2005), https://brook.gs/2uC2gag (arguing federalism should empower states to 
experiment and respond to local issues, but actual benefits are “a matter of considerable 
debate”). 
26. See supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
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Federalism also “promot[es] competition and embrac[es] diversity”27 
based on the belief that states can often resolve local issues better than 
bureaucratic federal agencies.28   
2. The Constitutional Origins of Federalism  
According to scholars, federalism is an evolutionary constitutional 
principle that demands regular and proactive consideration within modern 
American society.29 Because the drafters of the Constitution could not 
predict the future, the Constitution purposefully uses malleable principles, 
like federalism, to establish a national system that can adapt and address 
present and future concerns.30 Similarly, the Preamble to the Constitution 
demonstrates that the drafters wanted to establish “a more perfect Union”31 
that could protect and preserve states’ rights within a broader national 
framework.32 
 
27. .See Roth, supra note 25 (“Lawmakers of both parties too often look for big, one-
size-fits-all solutions that turn our national politics into an existential zero-sum game over 
controversial issues. If Republicans and Democrats can agree, in principle, on a federalist 
solution to marijuana, it just might open the door to more federalist solutions on other hot-
button issues.”); cf. Will Kenton, Zero-Sum Game, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2uS1TYZ (defining zero-sum as a situation “in which one person’s gain is 
equivalent to another’s loss, so the net change in wealth or benefit is zero”). 
28. See, e.g., Erin Ryan, Federalism and the Tug of War Within: Seeking Checks and 
Balance in the Interjurisdictional Gray Area, 66 MD. L. REV. 503, 580 (2007) (explaining 
that interjurisdictional regulatory problems, like national emergencies and environmental 
issues, are matters of “such local concern and/or expertise that it would not make sense to 
attack the problem as an exclusively national regulatory project” and thus the only effective 
result “flows from a collaborative approach”).  
29. See The Evolution of American Federalism, LUMEN LEARNING, 
https://bit.ly/2O86VHa (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (“The Constitution sketches a federal 
framework that aims to balance the forces of decentralized and centralized governance in 
general terms; it does not flesh out standard operating procedures that say precisely how 
the states and federal governments are to handle all policy contingencies imaginable. . . . 
This has led to changes in the configuration of federalism over time, changes corresponding 
to different historical phases that capture distinct balances between state and federal 
authority.”). See generally EUGENE BOYD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 95-518 GOV, 
AMERICAN FEDERALISM, 1776 TO 1997: SIGNIFICANT EVENTS (1997) (outlining the historic 
evolution of American federalism). 
30. Larry Kramer, Understanding Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485, 1488 (1994); 
cf. U.S. Founding Documents, CONGRESS.GOV, https://bit.ly/2TTWEz3 (last visited Jan. 
26, 2020) (providing the documents believed to be instrumental to the founding and 
philosophy of the United States). 
31. U.S. CONST. pmbl; see also Martin Diamond, The Federalist on Federalism: 
Neither a National Nor a Federal Constitution, But a Composition of Both, 86 YALE L.J. 
1273, 1280 (1977) (noting that the Framers believed a “voluntary association [of states] 
was inadequate”); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Preamble’s Significance for Constitutional 
Interpretation, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://bit.ly/34AC4dE (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) 
(noting that the Preamble has “significant implications both for how the Constitution is to 
be interpreted and applied and who has the power of constitutional interpretation”). 
32. See DAVID E. ENGDAHL, CONSTITUTIONAL FEDERALISM IN A NUTSHELL 5 (2d ed. 
1987) (explaining that America’s founding documents intended to “facilitate national 
coordination and union while preserving sub-national centers of political control and 
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Unlike the unitary system used in Great Britain,33 the drafters of the 
Constitution desired a political system “where it is necessary as a people 
to speak with one voice . . . but it [also] allows countless voices to be heard 
on matters pertaining to the day-to-day general welfare.”34 Although the 
Constitution does not mention federalism by name, there is no doubt that 
the Constitution intends to simultaneously protect individual liberties, 
while promoting national cohesion through the strategic delegation of 
power between state and federal governments.35 Today, the question is not 
whether federalism exists, but rather how constitutional powers should be 
divided between individual states and a more dominant federal 
government.36 
3. Determining the Limits of Federalism 
In addition to the literal division of constitutional powers between 
federal and state authority, federalism also demands a cohesive balance of 
powers amongst individual states.37 In other words, federalism should 
balance state and federal power through compromise, not selfish unilateral 
conduct.38 True balance requires states to develop their own partnership 
based upon shared objectives and goals within modern society.39 
Although the notion of shared powers may appear simple, the basic 
goals of federalism are often confused by vague language and varying 
constitutional interpretations.40 In theory, the Tenth Amendment says that 
all powers not expressly given to the federal government “are reserved to 
 
choice”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that federalism 
should benefit the citizens of all states), NO. 46 (James Madison) (explaining that national 
and state governments “are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people, 
constituted with different powers”). 
33. See Federalism, USHISTORY.ORG, https://bit.ly/2U2Mqj8 (last visited Apr. 22, 
2020). 
34. Akhil Reed Amar & Douglas W. Kmiec, Perspectives on the Constitution: 
Understanding Our Constitution, NAT’L CONST. CTR., https://bit.ly/2Bovcmh (last visited 
Apr. 20, 2020). 
35. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text. 
36. See infra Section II.A.3. 
37. See Hearing on The Federalism Debate: Why Doesn’t Washington Trust the 
States? Before the H. Subcomm. on Human Res. & Intergovernmental Relations of the H. 
Comm. on Government Reform & Oversight, 104th Cong. 113–18 (1995) (statement of 
Roger Pilon, Senior Fellow and Director of the Center for Constitutional Studies, Cato 
Institute) (testifying before Congress regarding the need for balanced relationships between 
state and federal governments), https://bit.ly/38EQREQ. 
38. See id.; see also Lawrence Jia, The Remnants of Federalism, HARV. POL. REV. 
(Dec. 16, 2019), https://bit.ly/2uQ2YAK. 
39. See Chemerinsky, supra note 6, at 116; see also GLEN KRUTZ ET AL., AMERICAN 
GOVERNMENT 2E 82–90 (Sylvie Waskiewicz et al. eds., 2d ed. 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2VFhAhs; Tivas Gupta, The Future of Federalism, HARV. POL. REV. (Sept. 
24, 2019), https://bit.ly/2vybx3h. 
40. See Kramer, supra note 30, at 1485 (noting that the complexity of federalism 
often “feels a bit like joining the proverbial blind men trying to describe an elephant”). 
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the States” and their local legislatures.41 In practice, the delegation of 
constitutional power to states is often overshadowed by general and 
specific powers prioritized for the three federal branches of government.42 
For example, the Constitution states that Congress “has legal authority as 
delegated to it [specifically] under the Constitution.”43 The Constitution 
also grants various powers to the President of the United States that impact 
the executive branch, the military, and the nation as a whole.44 Finally, the 
Constitution grants the United States Supreme Court (“Supreme Court”) 
the power to interpret the Constitution, to determine the proper balance of 
constitutional powers, and to define the legality of state and federal laws.45 
The federal government enjoys a wide range of specific and general 
powers under the Constitution.46 Although the Tenth Amendment 
promises to reserve constitutional powers to the states, the practical reality 
is that the federal government’s general powers can be used to 
purposefully limit what “remaining” powers are actually delegated to the 
states.47 One modern application of the Tenth Amendment involves the 
 
41. U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
42. See U.S. CONST. arts. I–III (enumerating the powers of the legislative, executive, 
and judicial branches). 
43. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (enumerating specific and general congressional 
powers, including the ability to “declare war” and to create “all laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers”); see also ANDREW 
NOLAN ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45323, FEDERALISM-BASED LIMITATIONS ON 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER: AN OVERVIEW, at intro. note, 1-6 (2018), https://bit.ly/2HinXP5. 
44. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (granting the President power to specific power to 
nominate “Judges of the supreme Court” and the general power to appointment “Officers 
of the United States,” including the U.S. Attorney General); see also 28 U.S.C. § 503 
(2012) (“The President shall appoint, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, an 
Attorney General of the United States. The Attorney General is the head of the Department 
of Justice.”). 
45. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 405 
(1816) (offering judicial affirmation that the federal government is “one of enumerated 
powers”); Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176–80 (1803) (establishing the principle of 
judicial review); The Court and Constitutional Interpretation, U.S. SUP. CT., 
https://bit.ly/2IziyCw (last visited Feb. 10, 2020) (“As the final arbiter of the law, the 
[Supreme] Court is charged with ensuring the American people the promise of equal justice 
under law and . . . functions as guardian and interpreter of the Constitution.”); cf. Charles 
Wise & Rosemary O’Leary, Intergovernmental Relations and Federalism in 
Environmental Management and Policy: The Role of the Courts, 57 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 150, 
151 (1997) (“[T]he courts can use their powers of judicial review to allocate decision power 
not only to agencies at various levels of government, but also to themselves as they decide 
the grounds for and scope of judicial review. How the courts implement their overlapping 
roles has profound effects for both management of public programs and the nature of the 
federal system in the United States.”). 
46. See supra notes 42–45 and accompanying text. 
47. See Tenth Amendment: Effect of Provision on Federal Powers, LEGAL INFO. INST., 
https://bit.ly/3eAGZzR (last visited Apr. 18, 2020) (discussing varying judicial views on 
the scope and power of the Tenth Amendment); see also South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 
505, 505, 512 (1988) (holding that “[t]he Tenth Amendment limits on Congress’ authority 
to regulate state activities are structural, not substantive—that is, the States must find their 
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conflict between federal drug law, state marijuana legislation, and general 
police powers.48 On one hand, states have “general police powers to enact 
legislation concerning health, safety, welfare, and morals that are inherent 
to government.”49 On the other hand, federal government officials have 
the discretionary ability to intervene in state activities that affect national 
interests.50 Although state drug legislation could be considered a 
permissible exercise of state police power, modern state marijuana 
legislation illustrates how the federal government can intervene and 
impact state law without enumerated constitutional powers.51 
Additionally, the executive branch adds significant confusion to the state 
marijuana legislation debate by selectively enforcing federal law through 
the unchecked discretion of federal prosecutors.52 
B. The Growth of State Marijuana Legislation 
Modern marijuana legislation represents a collective action problem 
that requires improved understanding and strategic cooperation amongst 
individual states.53 According to the Tenth Amendment, all powers not 
delegated to the federal government “are reserved to the States.”54 In 
theory, the Tenth Amendment gives states the autonomy to make their own 
laws and to act as “laboratories of democracy.”55 In practice, the federal 
government is often more powerful than any one state and can interject 
 
protection from congressional regulation through the national political process, not through 
judicially defined spheres of unregulable state activity”). 
48. See infra Section II.B; see also J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, Divided We 
Stand: Medical Marijuana and Federalism, HEALTH LAW., June 2015, at 17, 18–20. 
49. See MARK K. OSBECK & HOWARD BROMBERG, MARIJUANA LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
144 (2017). 
50. See id. at 144–46.  
51. See infra Section II.B.2. 
52. See infra Section II.B.4. 
53. See Richard C. Rich, A Cooperative Approach to the Logic of Collective Action: 
Voluntary Organizations and the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 17 J. VOLUNTARY ACTION RES. 5, 
10–12 (1988); cf. Maxwell L. Stearns, A Beautiful Mend: A Game Theoretical Analysis of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 45 WM. & MARY 1, 83, 110 (2003) (noting that 
“the prisoners’ dilemma characterizes the relationships that confront states, and nations, in 
choosing whether to enact special interest legislation that limits free trade” and states 
generally act in ways that attempt “to secure the benefit of a pure Nash equilibrium 
strategy”). 
54. U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Tenth Amendment: Scope and Purpose, LEGAL 
INFO. INST., https://bit.ly/2TZ7t6f (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) (explaining that the initial 
goal of the Tenth Amendment was to “allay fears that the new national government might 
seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the states might not be able to exercise fully 
their reserved powers” (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)). 
55. New State Ice, Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous 
state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic 
experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”); see also Laboratories of Democracy 
Database, NEW AM., https://bit.ly/38ppyhX (last visited Feb. 14, 2020). 
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itself into state issues without concern.56 Consequently, modern societal 
issues require a better understanding of what the Constitution says and also 
how to apply its precepts in light of modern social and political realities.57 
The American federal system permits cooperation amongst the 
federal branches of government, as well as between state and federal 
actors.58 Unfortunately, cooperation is not required and often treated as a 
last resort.59 Consequently, states often pursue individual state interests, 
while federal entities similarly pursue federal interests.60 Additionally, 
discussions of federalism often cite to the Tenth Amendment as “a bulwark 
against federal intrusion on state authority and individual liberty.”61 
Unfortunately, the vague language of the Tenth Amendment offers little 
guidance to resolve conflicts regarding the appropriate balance of state and 
federal powers.62 Although federalism anticipates disagreements between 
state and federal law, complex social issues like state marijuana legislation 
still require proactive action to avoid negatively impacting interstate 
relations that could lead to broader social harms.63  
1. The Origins of U.S. Marijuana Regulation 
Marijuana use can be traced back to Asia around the year 500 B.C.64 
Marijuana has also existed in America since the early seventeenth 
century,65 and questions of regulation and legality only arose around 
1906.66 Although the Food and Drug Act of 1906 only indirectly regulated 
 
56. See Marcus Hawkins, A Definition of Federalism: The Case for Reinvigorating 
State’s Rights, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://bit.ly/3coFdjY. 
57. See id. 
58. See id. 
59. See id.; see also Maxwell A. Cameron & Tulia G. Falleti, Federalism and the 
Subnational Separation of Powers, 35 PUBLIUS: J. FEDERALISM 245, 254–55 (2005) 
(explaining that federalism does not impose specific rules on the federal government, but 
it does recognize that state and federal government systems are “each supreme in its own 
sphere”). 
60. See Hawkins, supra note 56. 
61. Charles Cooper, The Constitution in One Sentence: Understanding the Tenth 
Amendment, HERITAGE FOUND. (Jan. 10, 2011), https://herit.ag/2Xv8iWe. 
62. See ENGDAHL, supra note 32, at 9 (“Attempts to use the tenth amendment to 
restrict federal power are made from time to time; but in the long run such attempts always 
and inevitably fail. The reason is that the amendment . . . affirms that what is not delegated 
to the United States is reserved, but says nothing to clarify what has been delegated and 
what has not been.”). 
63. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 49, at 240–41 (discussing how different 
marijuana-related legislation amongst neighboring states causes practical concerns like 
confusion regarding the applicability of federal law). 
64. See Marijuana, HISTORY.COM (Oct. 10, 2019), https://bit.ly/3aHJoqq. 
65. See id.; see also Research Guide: History of Marijuana Regulation in the United 
States, U. GA. SCH. LAW (Oct. 29, 2019, 8:46 AM), https://bit.ly/2St3j5g. 
66. See Pure Food and Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 59-384, 34 Stat. 768 (1906) (repealed 
1938) (providing an informal regulation of marijuana by “preventing the manufacture, sale, 
or transportation of adulterated or misbranded or poisonous or deleterious foods, drugs, 
medicines, and liquors, and for regulating traffic therein”). 
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marijuana passing through interstate commerce,67 the law paved the way 
for the eventual criminalization of marijuana under both state and federal 
law.68 
By the late 1920s, marijuana became a topic of significant federal 
concern.69 After the financial collapse of 1929, the ensuing “Great 
Depression” created widespread unemployment, which in turn “escalated 
public and governmental concern about the problem of marijuana.”70 
Additionally, other factors contributed to negative social perceptions of 
marijuana, including a governmental focus on familial welfare, the impact 
of drugs on children,71 and the general social perception that drug use led 
to crime and broad social disorder.72  
Over time, the criminalization of marijuana has become deeply 
engrained in modern American society, leading to a variety of social and 
political consequences.73 Notably, federal drug policies largely prevented 
 
67. See id.; see also Did You Know . . . Marijuana Was Once a Legal Cross-Border 
Import?, CBP.GOV (Dec. 20, 2019), https://bit.ly/2FnQOCF. 
68. See LISA N. SACCO, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43749, DRUG ENFORCEMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES: HISTORY, POLICY, AND TRENDS 2–8 (2014); see also Milestones in U.S. 
Food and Drug Law History, FDA.GOV (Jan. 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/37mWExB; 
Marijuana Timeline, FRONTLINE, https://to.pbs.org/2xzyhOg (last visited Apr. 12, 2020) 
(“After the Mexican Revolution of 1910, Mexican immigrants flooded into the U.S., 
introducing to American culture the recreational use of marijuana.” (citing Marihuana Tax 
Act of 1937, Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (1937) (repealed 1970) (the first federal law 
to regulate the “importation, cultivation, possession and/or distribution of marijuana”)). 
69. The Great Depression began in 1929 and lasted until 1939. See Richard H. Pells 
& Christina D. Romer, Great Depression, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 2, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2U9a6lq. 
70. See Marijuana Timeline, supra note 68; see also LISA N. SACCO & KRISTIN 
FINKLEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43164, STATE MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION INITIATIVES: 
IMPLICATIONS FOR FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 3 n.16 (2014) (“Congressional testimony 
indicated that marijuana, while it was a problem in the Southwest United States starting in 
the mid-1920s, became a national menace in the mid-1930s (1935-1937).”). 
71. See, e.g., H.J. Anslinger, Marijuana, Assassin of Youth, AM. MAG., July 1937, at 
1; Eric Schlosser, More Reefer Madness, ATLANTIC, Apr. 1997, at 90, 
https://bit.ly/2KrnziW; Stephen Siff, The Illegalization of Marijuana: A Brief History, 7 
ORIGINS: OHIO ST. U., no. 8, May 2014, at 1, https://bit.ly/2UTgGgS; Becky Little, Why the 
US Made Marijuana Illegal, HISTORY.COM (Aug. 31, 2018), https://bit.ly/3bFgqI4. 
72. See, e.g., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44782, THE MARIJUANA POLICY GAP AND THE 
PATH FORWARD 42 (2017).  
73. See, e.g., Zhuang Hao & Benjamin Cowan, The Cross-Border Spillover Effects of 
Recreational Marijuana Legalization 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 23426, 2017), https://bit.ly/2FFHcRV (noting that recreational marijuana legalization 
caused a “sharp increase in marijuana possession arrests of border counties relative to non-
border counties in both the Colorado and Washington regions”); Dominic Miranda, 
Legalized Weed in Illinois Affects Neighboring States Like Indiana, WTHI-TV 10 NEWS 
(Jan. 2, 2020, 6:31 PM), https://bit.ly/2FIHIPe. But see Report: Marijuana Legalization 
Not Associated with Adverse ‘Spillover’ Effects in Neighboring States, NORML.ORG (Oct. 
17, 2019), https://bit.ly/2slrDfi (arguing that “[a]dult-use marijuana legalization laws are 
not associated with any significant increase in cannabis-related criminal activity in 
neighboring states or counties” (citing ERIN J. FARLEY & STAN ORCHOWSKY, NAT’L 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., PUB. NO. 253137, MEASURING THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
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marijuana-focused medical research throughout the twentieth century.74 
Today, the absence of marijuana-related medical research is not only 
unfortunate, but it is also used to justify the continued criminalization of 
marijuana as a Schedule I drug under the federal Controlled Substances 
Act (“CSA”).75  
2. The Controlled Substances Act 
On October 27, 1970, President Richard M. Nixon signed the CSA 
into law.76 Codified under Title II of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse 
Prevention and Control Act of 1970,77 the CSA allows the federal 
government to regulate the lawful “[production], possession, use, 
importation, and distribution of certain drugs, substances, and precursor 
chemicals.”78 The CSA also classifies regulated substances into “one of 
five schedules based on [their] medical use, potential for abuse, and safety 
or dependence liability.”79 Schedule I is the most restrictive category and 
lists over 240 substances considered to have a high potential for abuse and 
no accepted medical benefit.80 
 
SYSTEM IMPACTS OF MARIJUANA LEGALIZATION AND DECRIMINALIZATION USING STATE 
DATA, at iv (2019), https://bit.ly/2TdFuPK)). 
74. See, e.g., Paul Armentano, 35 Years of Prohibition, NORML.ORG, 
https://bit.ly/2UgVAIK (citing U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON MARIHUANA & DRUG ABUSE, 
MARIHUANA: A SIGNAL OF MISUNDERSTANDING (1972), https://bit.ly/2RPbCYM); David 
Downs, The Science behind the DEA’s Long War on Marijuana, SCI. AM. (Apr. 19, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2GPUWu1 (arguing that “listing cannabis among the world’s deadliest drugs 
ignores decades of scientific and medical data”). 
75. See infra Section II.B.2. 
76. See Controlled Substances Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 
(codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 811–14 (2018)); see also JOANNA R. LAMPE, CONG. 
RESEARCH SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (CSA): A LEGAL 
OVERVIEW FOR THE 116TH CONGRESS 1–3 (2019); SACCO, supra note 68, at 5. 
77. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 801–971 (2010)). 
78. SACCO & FINKLEA, supra note 70, at 2; see also Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
29 (2005) (holding that the CSA is “a valid exercise of federal power . . . [used to] conquer 
drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances”). 
79. See 21 U.S.C. § 811 (2018); see also BRIAN T. YEH, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
RL34635, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT: REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS 2 & n.14 
app. (2012); The Controlled Substances Act, DEA.GOV, https://bit.ly/2RP2bZw (last 
visited Feb. 2, 2020) (discussing how to amend current schedules); SACCO & FINKLEA, 
supra note 70, at 2 & n.11.  
80. For an annual update of all regulated substances, see 21 C.F.R. § 1308.11–.15 
(2019). For additional information, see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, 
Foreword to LISTS OF: SCHEDULING ACTIONS, CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES, REGULATED 
CHEMICALS (2020), https://bit.ly/2SakY0o (“[S]ection 812 of the CSA lists only those 
substances which were controlled in 1970 when the law was enacted. Since then, over 200 
substances have been added, removed, or transferred from one schedule to another.”). 
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3. Modern Marijuana Use in the United States 
Marijuana has been listed as a Schedule I drug since 1970.81 Although 
many Schedule I drugs have a high potential for abuse and no accepted 
medical benefit, modern social support for marijuana is slowly changing 
state and federal opinion.82 In fact, the characterization of marijuana under 
the CSA is not only a point of concern among recreational marijuana users, 
but also medical advocates and non-users with practical benefits of the 
substance in mind.83 
Social views involving marijuana have drastically changed over 
time.84 Less than three decades ago, marijuana was illegal in all 50 states.85 
Today, thirty-three states and the District of Columbia have some form of 
legislation allowing the use of marijuana under specific conditions.86 
Although support for marijuana continues to increase,87 attempts to change 
 
81. See 21 U.S.C. § 812 (b)(1), (c)(c)(10) (2018); see also U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
DRUG ENF’T AGENCY, DRUGS OF ABUSE 9, 20 (2017), https://bit.ly/31juguS; Drug 
Scheduling, DEA.GOV, https://bit.ly/33D9yHR (last visited Mar. 21, 2020) (listing other 
Schedule I drugs like heroin, ecstasy, and LSD); What is medical marijuana?, NAT’L INST. 
ON DRUG ABUSE, https://bit.ly/2S5Ekn2 (last visited Mar. 22, 2020); YEH, supra note 79, 
at 2 & n.16 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 811(h)(1) (2017)) (explaining how the CSA was used 
alongside the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 to “place a drug or substance, on 
a temporary basis, into Schedule I when necessary to avoid an ‘imminent hazard to public 
safety’”). 
82. See Alex Kreit, What Will Federal Marijuana Reform Look Like?, 65 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 689, 689–92 (2015) (“So much energy has been directed at the debate about 
whether to change federal marijuana laws that the question of how to change them has been 
almost an afterthought. Barring a dramatic political reversal, however, it is no longer a 
matter of whether but when, and that makes the how of federal marijuana reform 
increasingly important.”); see also Justin McCarthy, Record-High Support for Legalizing 
Marijuana Use in U.S., GALLUP (Oct. 25, 2017), https://bit.ly/2IJzTrF (analogizing the rise 
of social support for marijuana to support for same-sex marriage). 
83. See, e.g., Earl L. Carter & Earl Blumenauer, If marijuana remains a Schedule I 
substance, we can never do the research everyone knows we need, NBC NEWS (Apr. 29, 
2019, 10:10 AM), https://nbcnews.to/2tlFVwM (explaining that the CSA limits legitimate 
medical access to marijuana and creates barriers to medical research); Kerry Cork & 
Hudson B. Kingston, Staff Att’y’s, Pub. Health Law Ctr. at Mitchell Hamline Sch. of Law, 
Webinar, What if Marijuana Were NOT a Schedule 1 Drug?: Legal and Policy Implications 
(June 6, 2019), https://bit.ly/3aZx8Sl (discussing how marijuana’s designation under the 
CSA negatively impacts international treaties and medical research); Christopher 
Ingraham, The government spent $18 million destroying marijuana plants last year, WASH. 
POST (Apr. 15, 2016, 10:18 AM), https://wapo.st/37SlHtF. 
84. See Marijuana Overview, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (Oct. 17, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/39Z6f0c. 
85. See Speights, supra note 18. 
86. See id.; see also Map of Marijuana Legality by State, DISA GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, 
https://bit.ly/2H2fqj2 (last visited Feb. 5, 2020) [hereinafter State Marijuana Map]. 
87. See Hannah Hartig & Abigail Geiger, About six-in-ten Americans support 
marijuana legalization, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 8, 2018), https://pewrsr.ch/2RzZQzp; see also 
Background of the Issue, PROCON.ORG (Dec. 27, 2018, 3:02 PM), https://bit.ly/2QidpT1 
(“More than half of US adults, over 128 million people, have tried marijuana, despite it 
being an illegal drug under federal law.” (citing Marist Poll: Weed & The American 
Family, MARIST INST. FOR PUB. OP. (Apr. 17, 2017), https://bit.ly/2oqJiuA)); From 
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federal legislation continue to fail and thus marijuana continues to cause 
significant tension between state actors and federal government officials.88  
States with marijuana-related legislation are not exactly alike.89 In 
fact, states with similar levels of social support for marijuana-related 
legislation often do not share similar goals or beliefs regarding the use of 
marijuana.90 Importantly, states with marijuana legislation often differ in 
two ways. First, state marijuana legislation can permit the use of marijuana 
for medicinal purposes, recreational purposes, or both.91 Second, state 
marijuana legislation either formally legalizes or merely decriminalizes 
the use and possession of marijuana.92  
The differences amongst state marijuana laws are not surprising 
because every state is comprised of diverse constituents who require 
individualized approaches to the same topic.93 States have also passed 
marijuana legislation at different times and under different 
 
Prohibition to Progress: A Status Report on Marijuana Legalization, DRUGPOLICY.ORG 
(Jan. 22, 2018), https://bit.ly/2E2YJ4T [hereinafter Status Report]. 
88. See Strengthening the Tenth Amendment Through Entrusting States Act, S. 3032, 
115th Cong. §§ 1-2 (2018) (describing a failed Congressional attempt to combat tensions 
between state and federal laws by eliminating federal interference in state legalization 
efforts without modifying the CSA); see also Tom Angell, Congress Votes To Block Feds 
From Enforcing Marijuana Laws In Legal States, FORBES (June 20, 2019, 5:37 PM), 
https://bit.ly/373HuNP (citing H.R. 3055, 116th Cong. § 531 (2019) (as passed by House, 
June 25, 2019)); Jonathan Martin, Gregoire to DEA: Make marijuana a legal drug, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011, 9:51 AM), https://bit.ly/2M4wGG8 (discussing how the 
governors of Rhode Island and Washington “petitioned the DEA to reclassify marijuana, 
recognize it has therapeutic value and allow it be treated as a prescription drug”); 2020 
Marijuana Policy Reform Legislation, MARIJUANA POL’Y PROJECT (Mar. 19, 2020), 
https://bit.ly/2GZP4yj. 
89. See SACCO & FINKLEA, supra note 70, at 5–6. 
90. See, e.g., Amy Mazurek, Attitudes and Influences Regarding the Legalization of 
Medical Marijuana, 19 IND. U. S. BEND UNDERGRADUATE RES. J. 105, 110 (2019) 
(discussing how voter preferences regarding medical marijuana are impacted by variables 
such as “the highest level of education, knowledge of benefits and side effects, past use, 
and whether respondents have minor children”). 
91. See State Laws, NORML.ORG, https://norml.org/laws (last visited Apr. 18, 2020); 
see also Marijuana Overview, supra note 84; State Marijuana Map, supra note 86. 
92. See Marijuana Overview, supra note 84 (noting that “[t]wenty-six states and the 
District of Columbia have decriminalized small amounts of marijuana,” which means that 
small amounts of marijuana “are a civil or local infraction, not a state crime”); see also 
German Lopez, 15 states have decriminalized–but not legalized–marijuana, VOX (July 10, 
2019, 5:34 PM), https://bit.ly/2v3Hpwd; Tom Murse, Decriminalization Versus 
Legalization of Marijuana, THOUGHTCO. (Jan. 16, 2020), https://bit.ly/382isA3 (defining 
decriminalization as “a loosening of criminal penalties imposed for personal marijuana use 
even though the manufacturing and sale of the substance remain illegal” and legalization 
as the “lifting or abolishment of laws banning the possession and personal use of 
marijuana”). 
93. See Mazurek, supra note 90, at 110; see also Natalie Fertig, The Great American 
Cannabis Experiment, POLITICO (Oct. 14, 2019), https://politi.co/3bk6i7e (discussing how 
generational alignments impact support for marijuana legislation); Sarah Trumble et al., 
All State Marijuana Laws Are Not Created Equal, THIRD WAY (Feb. 17, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2Kj1hzS. 
2020 MARIJUANA LEGISLATION: GAME THEORY & INTERSTATE COOP. 783 
circumstances.94 Consequently, disparate state laws affirm that the unique 
needs of each state legislature produce inherently individualized laws, 
which in turn also explains why there is often little appetite for interstate 
cooperation.95 Additionally, the inconsistent use of prosecutorial 
discretion to uphold federal law is another critical consideration to 
understand the individualized nature and inherent tension surrounding 
state marijuana legislation.96 
4. Prosecutorial Discretion and Marijuana Use 
The term “prosecutorial discretion” refers to a federal prosecutor’s 
ability to decide when to file criminal charges on behalf of the federal 
government.97 Prosecutorial discretion is an important legal tool for law 
enforcement officials.98 However, the unpredictable nature of 
prosecutorial discretion can also create confusion that negatively impacts 
the rule of law. Such concerns are especially true when the same federal 
laws are enforced differently in certain states or even within subsections 
of the same state.99 Federal courts can also contribute to existing confusion 
by presuming that federal prosecutors use their discretion in good faith, 
which in turn impacts individual states, federal judicial districts, and the 
broader American legal system.100  
Under the current federal structure, the President of the United States 
nominates the United States Attorney General (“Attorney General”).101 
Once confirmed by the Senate, the Attorney General establishes the 
internal priorities of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and communicates 
 
94. See State Marijuana Map, supra note 86. 
95. See OSBECK & BROMBERG, supra note 49, at 239–41. 
96. See infra Section II.B.4. 
97. See Prosecutorial Discretion, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, (10th ed. 2014). 
98. See Stephanos Bibas, The Need For Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 TEMP. POL. & 
C.R. 369, 372 (2010). 
99. See W. RANDOLPH TESLIK, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION: THE DECISION TO 
CHARGE 12–15 (1975), https://bit.ly/323IC2X; see also Celesta A. Albonetti, Prosecutorial 
Discretion: The Effects of Uncertainty, 21 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 291, 292 (1987) (discussing 
three areas of “unfettered discretion” for prosecuting attorneys: “(1) the circumstances 
under which a criminal charge will be filed; (2) the level at which an alleged offender will 
be charged; and (3) when to discontinue prosecution.”); Bruce A. Green, Prosecutorial 
Discretion: The Difficulty and Necessity of Public Inquiry, 123 DICK. L. REV. 589, 613 
(2019); 9-27.000–Principles of Federal Prosecution, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, 
https://bit.ly/37qTyIZ (last visited Feb. 15, 2020). 
100. See Twenty-Second Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 81 GEO. L.J. 853, 
1029 (1993) (arguing that prosecutorial discretion is due in part to a “regard for the 
separation of powers doctrine and in part because courts recognize that the decision to 
prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review”); see also West v. Holder, 60 F. Supp. 
3d 197, 203 (2015) (“[The government’s] broad discretion rests largely on the recognition 
that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” (quoting Wayte 
v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985)). 
101. See Office of the Attorney General, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/ag (last visited Apr. 12, 2020). 
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those preferences to 93 United States Attorneys (“U.S. Attorneys”) 
throughout the country.102 Finally, each U.S. Attorney implements 
individualized procedures and strategies that embody the Attorney 
General’s guidance and impact how Assistant United States Attorneys 
(“AUSAs”) address local issues in their respective regions.103  
The exercise of prosecutorial discretion is beneficial, but also largely 
invisible and unreviewable.104 Prosecutorial discretion also allows 
prosecutors to act as intermediaries between courts and the police by 
selectively enforcing criminal laws and defining potential criminal 
penalties “outside the formal legal system.”105 Heavy reliance on federal 
prosecutorial discretion also creates a trickle-down system wherein the 
guidance of the Attorney General is interpreted and applied through the 
literal decisions of individual AUSAs.106 
Prosecutorial discretion is not a perfect system, but it remains a 
concept of modern social and legal importance for three reasons.107 First, 
the decision to prosecute directly impacts individual criminal offenders.108 
Second, the unpredictable nature of prosecutorial discretion can also 
impact ancillary topics like employment and immigration laws,109 low-
 
102. See Mission, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Sept. 22, 2016), https://bit.ly/2WyR0qA; U.S. 
Attorneys Listing, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Mar. 30, 2020), https://bit.ly/2SJHBZM. 
103. See Attorneys, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Oct. 24, 2019), https://bit.ly/38xsv0b. 
104. See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. 
REV. 505, 594 (2001). 
105. See id.; see also Jordan A. Sklansky, The Nature and Function of Prosecutorial 
Power, 106 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 473, 504–05 (2016). 
106. See Henry L. Chambers, Jr., Scope of Executive Power: The President, 
Prosecutorial Discretion, Obstruction of Justice, and Congress, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 609, 
616–18 & n.53 (2018) (“The Attorney General sets litigation policy for the DOJ and directs 
United States Attorneys in litigation matters.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 519 (2012)). 
107. See Green, supra note 99, at 601 (“Prosecutors’ discretionary decisions are 
enormously important, whether they are made by an office categorically or ‘wholesale’ by 
adopting policies for recurring situations, or they are made individually or ‘retail’ by one 
or more prosecutors considering all the relevant and available facts on an ad hoc basis.”). 
But see Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus Prosecutorial Accountability, 
157 U. PENN. L. REV. 959, 1000–01 & n.162 (2009) (arguing that prosecutors utilize 
structures that “create direct control and political accountability, promoting consistent 
enforcement” (citing Memorandum from John Ashcroft, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
to all Federal Prosecutors (Sept. 22, 2003), https://bit.ly/2HrIXDb)). 
108. See Sklansky, supra note 105, at 484. 
109. See Dora Lane & Anthony Hall, Working Though the Haze: What Legal 
Marijuana Means for Nevada Employers, NAT’L L. REV. (Dec. 14, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/2IOAt9V; see also Sam Kamim, Prosecutorial Discretion in the Context of 
Immigration and Marijuana Law Reform: The Search for a Limiting Principle, 14 OHIO 
ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 191 (2016). 
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income communities,110 and financial markets.111 Finally, prosecutorial 
discretion can impact the behavior of states, which in turn can either lead 
to interstate cooperation or individualized conduct that exacerbates current 
confusion.112 One example demonstrating how prosecutorial discretion 
can impact state behavior involves the conflicting DOJ memos provided 
by former Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole and former Attorney 
General Jefferson B. Sessions.113 
a. The Cole Memo 
In August 2013, then-Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole 
distributed an internal DOJ memorandum regarding the federal 
enforcement of marijuana-related crimes (“Cole Memo”).114 Rather than 
prosecuting every potential violation, the Cole Memo asked U.S. 
Attorneys to reprioritize law enforcement efforts and to focus on eight 
specific uses of marijuana.115 Additionally, the Cole Memo reaffirmed the 
 
110. See Mona Zhang, Legal Marijuana Is A Boon To The Economy, Finds Study, 
FORBES (Mar. 13, 2018, 5:34 PM), https://bit.ly/2QSirVQ (highlighting that in Pueblo 
County, Colorado, “[r]esearchers found that legalizing marijuana had a positive impact on 
the economy . . . [and] a taxed and regulated cannabis industry contributed more than $58 
million to the local economy,” including “$420,000 to scholarships for 210 students”); see 
also Mrinalini Krishna, The Economic Benefits of Legalizing Weed, INVESTOPEDIA (Dec. 
11, 2019), https://bit.ly/2BdTUUm  (highlighting benefits such as the creation of tax 
revenue, local income and job opportunities, financial investment opportunities, and 
federal law enforcement savings).  
111. See Julie Andersen Hill, Banks, Marijuana, and Federalism, 65 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 597, 597 (2015) (“[A]lthough the United States’ dual banking system comprises 
both federal- and state-chartered institutions, when it comes to marijuana banking, federal 
regulation is pervasive and controlling.”); Steven Mare, He Who Comes Into Court Must 
Not Come With Green Hands: The Marijuana Industry’s Ongoing Struggle With The 
Illegality And Unclean Hands Doctrines, 44 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1351, 1353 (2016) 
(highlighting that in 2015, Colorado marijuana sales generated $135 million in state tax 
revenue). 
112. See Kreit, supra note 82, at 693-95 (explaining that prosecutorial discretion has 
created a confusing “top-down” marijuana non-enforcement policy that could result in “no 
ex post facto bar to prosecuting marijuana business operators for conduct they undertook 
while the nonenforcement prosecutorial guidance was in effect”); see also OSBECK & 
BROMBERG, supra note 49, at 240–43. 
113. See infra Sections II.B.4.a–.b; see also Attorney General: Jeff Sessions, U.S. 
DEP’T JUSTICE (Nov. 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2UZAMFE; Former Deputy Attorney General 
James Cole, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE ARCHIVES (Feb. 14, 2017), https://bit.ly/38u2JKg. 
114. See Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice 
for all United States Att’y’s (Aug. 29, 2013) [hereinafter Cole Memo]; see also Dep’t of 
Justice Press Release Regarding Memorandum from James M. Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice for all  United States Att’y’s (Aug. 29, 2013),  https://bit.ly/2kMC3w9 
[hereinafter Cole Guidance Summary]. 
115. Cole Memo, supra note 114 (identifying eight enforcement areas for federal 
prosecutors to prioritize: marijuana distribution to minors, the receipt of marijuana sales 
revenue by organized crime and gangs, the diversion of marijuana from states where its 
use is legal into other states, use of state-allowed marijuana use as a front for broader 
trafficking, marijuana-related violence, drugged driving and the exacerbation of public 
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criminalization and illegality of marijuana under the CSA, while also 
implying that most marijuana infractions should not be prosecuted if they 
occur within states with marijuana-friendly laws.116  
Although the Cole Memo is a topic of significant legal discussion, 
only three points are worth noting herein. First, the Cole Memo expressly 
prioritized state legislation over pre-existing federal law.117 Second, the 
Cole Memo demonstrated that prosecutorial discretion could narrow the 
impact of federal law without actually changing the law itself.118 Finally, 
the Cole Memo implicitly encouraged states to circumvent the 
bureaucracy of Congress by legalizing marijuana via state law without any 
guarantee of federal support in the future.119 While the Cole Memo did not 
produce new law,120 the memo did lead to internal confusion within the 
DOJ and amongst state legislatures.121 
 
health concerns, marijuana growth and production on public lands, and the possession or 
use of marijuana on federal property). 
116. See Mare, supra note 111, at 1357 (“Cole cautioned that the federal government 
and the DOJ do still have the right to interfere should they wish to, explaining that ‘[i]f 
state enforcement efforts are not sufficiently robust . . . the federal government may seek 
to . . . bring individual enforcement actions, including criminal prosecutions.’” (quoting 
Cole Memo, supra note 114)). 
117. Kreit, supra note 82, at 693-95. 
118. See Bibas, supra note 98, at 372. 
119. See SACCO & FINKLEA, supra note 70, at 2 (“The [Cole] memorandum implied 
that the federal government’s drug enforcement priorities would likely not include 
prosecuting individuals or organizations engaged in marijuana activities that are conducted 
in clear compliance with state laws that permit and regulate them.”); see also Rosalie Winn, 
Note, Hazy Future: The Impact of Federal and State Legal Dissonance on Marijuana 
Business, 53 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 215, 223-25 (2016) (“While the guidance memos do offer 
some insight into federal enforcement, they do not offer marijuana businesses certainty as 
a defense against individual prosecutions. Moreover, enforcement priorities and guidance 
may change with future presidential administrations, further undermining the ability of 
marijuana businesses to rely on the guidance.”). 
120. See Cole Guidance Summary, supra note 114 (providing an update to the DOJ’s 
“federal marijuana enforcement policy”). 
121. See id. (“The Cole Memo reflected presidential control over a broad law 
enforcement policy tempered by federalism concerns. As long as states attempted to stop 
behavior that triggered the federal government’s enforcement priorities, state and local law 
enforcement would largely be left to address marijuana-related activity. The Cole Memo 
concluded by indicating that it did not guarantee that CSA violations that did not 
contravene the DOJ’s enforcement priorities would be immune from prosecution.”); see 
also Brad Auerbach, How Cannabis Entrepreneurs Feel About Sessions’ Reversal of the 
Cole Memo, FORBES (Mar. 3, 2018, 7:32 PM), https://bit.ly/2t8yZiK; Hilary Bricken, 
Reading the Pot Leaves: What the Sessions Memo Means for Marijuana in the U.S., ABOVE 
LAW (Jan. 8, 2018, 4:20 PM), https://bit.ly/2D73MCk; Sadie Gurman, Pot stocks plummet 
as Sessions takes aim at cannabis, BNN BLOOMBERG (Jan. 4, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2St2CK8; Nick Wing & Ryan J. Reilly, Marijuana Industry Not Freaking Out 
Over the Threat of Federal Crackdown, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 8, 2018), 
https://bit.ly/2RnrIdz. 
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b. The Sessions Memo 
In January 2018, then-Attorney General Jefferson B. Sessions issued 
a new marijuana-related memorandum (“Sessions Memo”) in order to 
rescind the guidance set forth in the Cole Memo and to reaffirm the 
validity of the CSA.122 Above all, the Sessions Memo reflected a “return 
to the rule of law”123 and reiterated that marijuana is still a harmful 
substance that is closely connected to violent crime and gang-related 
enterprises.124 The Sessions Memo also reminded U.S. Attorneys to 
uphold current federal drug laws, even when differing state law exists.125 
Although the Sessions Memo suggested that state marijuana legislation 
would no longer be permitted, the memo’s impact has varied across states 
and even spurred bipartisan congressional support for state marijuana 
legislation.126 
At the time of this writing, different forms of state marijuana 
legislation and prosecutorial inconsistency still exist among the states.127 
The Sessions Memo also remains valid, even though the desire to 
prosecute state-compliant marijuana-related activity is uncommon and 
often unclear.128 To supplement existing scholarship involving state 
marijuana legislation,129 this Comment utilizes game theory to evaluate 
 
122. Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice for 
all United States Att’y’s (Jan. 4, 2018) [hereinafter Sessions Memo]; see also Dep’t of 
Justice Press Release Memorandum from Jefferson B. Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice for all United States Att’y’s (Jan. 4, 2018), https://bit.ly/2CV2etq (rescinding prior 
DOJ guidance and explicitly directing the renewed enforcement of federal marijuana laws) 
[hereinafter Sessions Guidance Summary]. 
123. Sessions Guidance Summary, supra note 122. 
124. See id. (“This return to the rule of law is also a return of trust and local control 
to federal prosecutors who know where and how to deploy Justice Department resources 
most effectively to reduce violent crime, stem the tide of the drug crisis, and dismantle 
criminal gangs.”). 
125. See id.; see also Wick Sollers et al., DOJ Issues Updated U.S. Attorneys’ 
Manual, A.B.A. (Feb. 5, 2019), https://bit.ly/38ykvMq (noting that the Sessions Memo can 
be found in Section 1-17.000 of the revised Justice Manual, which solidifies the DOJ’s 
“commitment to this approach”). 
126. See, e.g., Chronic Dispute: What The Sessions Marijuana Memo Means For 
Employers, FISHER PHILLIPS (Jan. 5, 2018), https://bit.ly/2OZZfr1 (“[T]he legality of 
marijuana use remains confusing, to say the least: it is dependent on the state you are in”); 
Senator Cory Gardner, Gardner Defends States’ Rights on Senate Floor, YOUTUBE (Jan. 
4, 2018), https://bit.ly/2Rrb1y2; Elizabeth Wittemyer, The Sessions Memo: Its Legal and 
Financial Implications, MARIJUANA EDUC. INITIATIVE, https://bit.ly/39Dbhyr (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2020). 
127. See supra notes 84–92 and accompanying text; see also LAMPE, supra note 76, 
at 23–29 (discussing the current “marijuana policy gap”); THE MARIJUANA POLICY GAP 
AND THE PATH FORWARD, supra note 72, at 11–20. 
128. See Tom Firestone, The Sessions Memorandum: Two Years Later, BAKER 
MCKENZIE: GLOBAL CANNABIS COMPLIANCE BLOG (Jan. 6, 2020), https://bit.ly/2yb8eQu. 
129. See, e.g., Chemerinsky et al., supra note 6, at 116–20 (discussing the utilization 
of “cooperative federalism”); Kreit, supra note 82, at 699–711 (offering three proposals to 
“solve the conflict between state and federal marijuana laws”). 
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state conduct and to discuss why interstate cooperation should be a critical 
priority going forward.130  
C. Game Theory 
Game theory refers to “a theoretical framework to conceive social 
situations among competing players and produce optimal decision-making 
of independent and competing [rational] actors in a strategic setting.”131 In 
practical terms, game theory is a “science of strategy” that makes 
assumptions and attempts to determine the optimal decision in an 
otherwise difficult situation.132 
Game theory cannot predict the future, but the repetitive use of game 
theory models can be used to identify actor “identities, preferences, and 
available strategies and how these strategies affect the outcome” of 
complex social situations.133 For example, game theory principles can 
offer insights into human decision-making134 and a variety of other 
practical topics including “psychology, evolutionary biology, war, 
politics, economics, and business.”135  
 
130. See infra Section II.C. 
131. See Adam Hayes, Game Theory, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/3bCIqfw; Daniel McNulty, The Basics of Game Theory, INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 
13, 2019), https://bit.ly/2joiVVu [hereinafter McNulty Basics]; see also Kenneth Chang, 
Explaining a Cornerstone of Game Theory: John Nash’s Equilibrium, N.Y. TIMES (May 
24, 2015), https://nyti.ms/2yPT80z (highlighting that game theory is “essentially the study 
of how to come up with a winning strategy in the game of life — especially when you do 
not know what your competitors are doing and the choices do not always look promising”). 
132. Hayes, supra note 131 (suggesting that game theory leads to strategic decision-
making that can resolve issues irrespective of the conduct of “competing actors”).  
133. See id. (explaining that game theory “helps to predict likely outcomes when 
[actors] engage in certain behaviors”) (emphasis added); see also G. Owen, Game Theory, 
in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 5863, 5868 
(Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001); Angela M. Koos, Game theory and its 
practical applications 6–7 (May 1, 1997) (unpublished Presidential Scholars Thesis, 
University of Northern Iowa) (on file with the University of Northern Iowa Honors 
Program) (noting that the Prisoner’s Dilemma “is a universal concept that has practical 
applications to biology, psychology, sociology, economics, law, and other disciplines 
where a conflict of interests may exist”); John Cassidy, The Triumph (and Failure) of John 
Nash’s Game Theory, NEW YORKER (May 27, 2015), https://bit.ly/2ALBhJm; Dana 
Trexler Smith & Gary H. Levin, The Benefits of Game Theory in Negotiations and 
Mediations, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Oct. 6, 2015, 12:00 AM), https://bit.ly/33AErN0. 
134. McNulty Basics, supra note 131 (defining a “game” as “[a]ny set of 
circumstances that has a result dependent on the actions of two of more decision-makers 
(players)”). 
135. See Hayes, supra note 131; see also MARTIN J. OSBORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
GAME THEORY 22 (2009) (explaining that game theory can be used to understand “firms 
competing for business, political candidates competing for votes, jury members deciding a 
verdict, [and even] long-term relationships”); Randal C. Picker, An Introduction to Game 
Theory and the Law 2 (Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics, Working Paper 
No. 22, 1994) (“Game theory is a set of tools and a language for describing and predicting 
strategic behavior.”); Elvis Picardo, How Game Theory Strategy Improves Decision 
Making, INVESTOPEDIA (May 19, 2019), https://bit.ly/2wnuANZ; Jesus Rodriguez, Game 
2020 MARIJUANA LEGISLATION: GAME THEORY & INTERSTATE COOP. 789 
In contrast to the proposed benefits of game theory, critics argue that 
game theory offers minimal practical value because it relies upon 
unrealistic assumptions that cannot apply in modern society.136 Some 
critics even question whether cooperation is necessary at all.137 However, 
such criticisms inappropriately focus on the limitations of game theory 
without recognizing the practical value that can be gleaned from its use. 
Game theory cannot predict the future, nor is it a formal “scientific theory” 
like those used in scientific laboratories.138 In reality, game theory is a 
practical tool that offers social benefit by helping to “determine the most 
likely outcomes” in real-life situations involving “known payouts or 
quantifiable consequences.”139  
1. Basic Assumptions 
Several different game theories exist.140 This Comment solely 
considers the principles of non-cooperative game theory to understand 
why “rational individuals make decisions” to achieve their own goals.141 
Non-cooperative games can implicate a range of situations, from a 
childhood game “Rock-Paper-Scissors,” to international conflicts, to 
collective state actions seeking to avoid nuclear proliferation.142 Despite 
 
Theory for Data Scientists, TOWARDS DATA SCI. (Jan. 17, 2019), https://bit.ly/31XEQIq 
(“The history of game theory is attached to the history of computer science.”). 
136. See ANTHONY KELLY, DECISION MAKING USING GAME THEORY 1 (2003) 
(explaining that game theory models do not reflect “the social reality of decision making”); 
see also McNulty Basics, supra note 131 (discussing the need for basic assumptions like 
“rationality” and “maximization”). 
137. See, e.g., Emily Singer, Game Theory Calls Cooperation into Question, QUANTA 
MAG. (Feb. 11, 2015), https://bit.ly/2OZLZTf; KELLY, supra note 136, at 174–80 (offering 
a critique of game theory assumptions). 
138. See Cassidy, supra note 133 (“[Game theory] is an intellectual tool—a way of 
organizing our thoughts systematically, applying them in a consistent manner, and ruling 
out errors. Like Marshallian supply-and-demand analysis or Bayesian statistics, it can be 
applied to many different problems, and its utility depends on the particular context.”); see 
also Bryn Farnsworth, Game Theory and Human Behavior: Introduction and Examples, 
IMOTIONS: BLOG (Aug. 21, 2018), https://bit.ly/2vzxwqv. 
139. See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
140. See Hayes, supra note 131 (noting that various game theory types exist, 
including: symmetric/asymmetric, simultaneous/sequential, cooperative/non-cooperative). 
141. Id. (“Noncooperative game theory deals with how rational economic agents deal 
with each other to achieve their own goals.”); see also AVINAHSH K. DIXIT & BARRY J. 
NALEBUFF, THE ART OF STRATEGY: A GAME THEORIST’S GUIDE TO SUCCESS IN BUSINESS 
AND LIFE 12 (2008) (predicting how people will behave by assessing choices in a presumed 
non-moral and non-ethical context); GRAHAM ROMP, GAME THEORY: INTRODUCTION AND 
APPLICATIONS 1-2 (1997) (requiring assumptions about individualism, rationality, and 
mutual interdependence). 
142. See Hayes, supra note 131; see also Peter Revesz, A Game-Theoretic Analysis 
of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 97–98 (Nov. 1, 2014)(unpublished manuscript)(on 
file with the University of Nebraska-Lincoln Library system); Andreas Kluth, The Risk of 
Nuclear Proliferation (and War) Is Growing, BLOOMBERG OPINION (Jan. 9, 2020, 2:00 
AM), https://bloom.bg/2wtxGjU. 
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the name, non-cooperative game theory does not assert that cooperation is 
impossible.143 Instead, non-cooperative game theory merely presumes that 
insufficient incentives make cooperation highly unlikely.144 
Importantly, the success of non-cooperative game theory requires 
users to have a sufficient understanding of actor goals and priorities.145 
Accordingly, three basic presumptions must be considered to properly 
apply non-cooperative game theory to modern marijuana legislation: 
individualism, rationality, and mutual interdependence.146 Individualism 
refers to the notion that non-cooperative game theory best applies to 
situations involving parties who act out “of their own [self] interest,” 
regardless of the impacts on others.147 Non-cooperative games also assume 
that players will always act rationally in order to avoid jeopardizing their 
self-interests.148 Finally, mutual interdependence refers to the presumption 
that “the welfare of any one individual in a game is, at least partially, 
determined by the actions of other players in the game.”149  
2. The Nash Equilibrium 
When game theory models evaluate the potential conduct of relevant 
actors under specific conditions, that analysis results in an interactive 
 
143. See E. van Damme, Game Theory: Noncooperative Games, in INTERNATIONAL 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 5873, 5873 (Neil J. Smelser & 
Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) (“A game is said to be noncooperative if there are no possibilities 
for commitment (unilateral or multilateral) outside the rules of the game. In contrast, in 
cooperative games, players can form coalitions with the possibilities for doing so not being 
explicitly modeled within the rules of the game.”); see also Non-Cooperative Games, 
SYSTEMS INNOVATION, https://bit.ly/2uPNyMO (last visited Feb. 16, 2020). 
144. See Non-Cooperative Games, supra note 143. 
145. See Martin Shubik, Game Theory, Law, and the Concept of Competition, 60 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 285, 300 (1991) (“A better understanding of key concepts, such as 
competition, collusion, efficiency, inside information, fair division, and fiduciary 
responsibility is where the contribution of game theoretic thought can be significant. The 
contribution of game theory to the law comes in the form of a new language to aid in the 
understanding of conflict, competition, collusion, and cooperation.”). 
146. See ROMP, supra note 141, at 1–4 (noting that assumptions are only problematic 
“if the results based on [those] assumption[s] are found to be unhelpful”); see also Russell 
B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1057 (2000); Brian Martin, 
The Selective Usefulness of Game Theory, 8 SOC. STUD. OF SCI. 85, 91–94 (1978) 
(discussing the underlying values of game theory); Cassidy, supra note 133 (“[T]he Nash 
criteria doesn’t necessarily give the correct answer, [but] it often rules out a lot of 
implausible [answers], and it usually helps pin down the logic of the situation.”). 
147. See Theodore L. Turocy & Berhard von Stengel, Game Theory 4-7 (London Sch. 
of Econ., Working Paper No. LSE-CDAM-2001-09, 2001), https://bit.ly/2ycS7Ac; see also 
ROMP, supra note 141, at 19 (noting that actors assume that unselfish behavior will offer 
“no incremental benefit” because everyone else will naturally act in selfish ways). 
148. See Picker, supra note 135, at 2 (explaining how game theory originates from 
classical microeconomics, which presumed that individual decisionmakers would seek to 
“maximize[] utility or profits subject to constraints”). 
149. Id. at 4. 
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evaluation called a “game.”150 Although innumerable variables can exist 
and impact real life situations, every game eventually results in an 
outcome where no player can improve his or her payoff through a 
unilateral change in conduct.151 This eventual outcome is referred to as the 
“Nash Equilibrium,” in honor of its inventor, the American mathematician 
John Nash.152 
Importantly, the Nash Equilibrium is not realized by simply waiting 
for a situation to play out.153 Instead, deliberate steps must be taken to 
“find” the Nash Equilibrium and to thereby derive meaning from the game 
for future application in real-life situations.154 Although the Nash 
Equilibrium is best known as an economic tool,155 the Nash Equilibrium 
is a “decision-making theorem” that applies to a host of different real-life 
situations156 and also enjoys popularity through modern film157 and its 
practical value when applied to situations best described as a “Prisoner’s 
Dilemma.”158  
 
150. Hayes, supra note 131; KELLY, supra note 136, at 1 (“[G]ames like chess and 
bridge fall within the ambit of game theory, but so do many other social situations which 
are not commonly regarded as games in the everyday sense of the word.”). 
151. See Hayes, supra note 131 (“It can also be thought of as ‘no regrets,’ in the sense 
that once a decision is made, the player will have no regrets concerning decisions 
considering the consequences.”); see also James Chen, Nash Equilibrium, INVESTOPEDIA 
(Feb. 3, 2020), https://bit.ly/2yR1rJh (“Nash equilibrium is a concept within game theory 
where the optimal outcome of a game is where there is no incentive to deviate from their 
initial strategy.”). 
152. See John Nash – American Mathematician, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (June 
9, 2019), https://bit.ly/2xClf1m (offering an overview of John Nash and his 
accomplishments within the field of economic game theory); see also Charles A. Holt & 
Alvin E. Roth, The Nash equilibrium: A Perspective, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 
3999, 4000 (2004). 
153. Daniel McNulty, Game Theory: Beyond the Basics, INVESTOPEDIA (June 25, 
2019), https://bit.ly/3dlzkVu. 
154. See id. (providing a standard three-step process to “find” the Nash Equilibrium). 
155. See Chen, supra note 151; see also John Wooders, John Nash and his 
contribution to Game Theory and Economics, CONVERSATION (May 26, 2015, 3:13 AM), 
https://bit.ly/2Q4iRcb.  
156. See Chen, supra note 151. 
157. See A Beautiful Mind, IMDB, https://imdb.to/2HvsGgq (last visited Feb. 16, 
2020); see also Patricia Bauer, A Beautiful Mind, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Sept. 13, 
2017), https://bit.ly/2qg8s1R (offering a synopsis of the film and John’s innovative work 
despite prolonged mental illness); Chang, supra note 131 (explaining that one infamous 
scene in the film, “A Beautiful Mind,” is when John Nash conceived the Nash Equilibrium 
by realizing that unselfish cooperation could allow a group of young men to gain the 
attention of a beautiful, blonde female and her friends in a local bar). 
158. See Chen, supra note 151; see also Ben Duronio, 7 Easy Ways to Use Game 
Theory to Make Your Life Better, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 4, 2012, 2:43 PM), 
https://read.bi/2DlLMWk (listing practical uses for the Nash Equilibrium, such as salary 
negotiations, purchasing a car, making money in stock markets, real estate negotiations, 
fantasy sports, poker games, and auctions); S.K., What is the Nash equilibrium and why 
does it matter?, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2016), https://econ.st/2RllZ3k (“[The Nash 
Equilibrium] helps economists work out how competing companies set their prices, how 
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3. The Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game refers to “a paradox in decision 
analysis in which two individuals acting in their own self-interests do not 
produce the optimal outcome.”159 Additionally, the Prisoner’s Dilemma 
game is often used to analyze situational decision making, especially when 
actors are confronted with imperfect information.160 When applying the 
Nash Equilibrium to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both parties “will make the 
move that is best for them individually but worse for them collectively.”161 
In other words, both players will betray each other out of self-interest, 
rather than cooperating to achieve more superior results.162  
Similar to other game theory games, the Prisoner’s Dilemma involves 
a set of basic assumptions and stereotypes that do not always reflect the 
reality of modern society.163 However, the use of stereotypes and 
assumptions to predict actor behavior is a critical step in the process.164 
When proper assumptions are used to evaluate real-life social issues like 
state marijuana legislation, game theory games will not specifically predict 
how particular states will act, but they can help better understand why 
states act in particular ways today and how those aggregated decisions will 
lead to likely outcomes in the future.165  
II. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 
Both federalism and the Constitution presume that disagreements 
between state and federal law will occur,166 but neither topic explains how 
to resolve the tensions that arise when states blatantly ignore existing 
federal law.167 Additionally, increasing social support for the use and 
 
governments should design auctions to squeeze the most from bidders and how to explain 
the sometimes self-defeating decisions that groups make.”). 
159. See Jim Chappelow, Prisoner’s Dilemma, INVESTOPEDIA (May 23, 2019), 
https://bit.ly/2RQJjZv. 
160. Hayes, supra note 131 (“Consider the example of two criminals arrested for a 
crime. Prosecutors have no hard evidence to convict them. However, to gain a confession, 
officials remove the prisoners from their solitary cells and question each one in separate 
chambers. Neither prisoner has the means to communicate with each other. Officials 
present four deals, often displayed as a 2 x 2 box.”); see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., 
GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 312-13 (2d ed. 1995). 
161. See Hayes, supra note 131; see also Elvis Picardo, The Prisoner’s Dilemma in 
Business and the Economy, INVESTOPEDIA (Jan. 22, 2020), https://bit.ly/2yPLnrq (“[The] 
Prisoner’s dilemma basically provides a framework for understanding how to strike a 
balance between cooperation and competition, and is a very useful tool for strategic 
decision-making.”). 
162. See Hayes, supra note 131. 
163. See id. 
164. See ROMP, supra note 141, at 1–4. 
165. OSBORNE, supra note 135, at 13 (noting that actors are affected by the actions of 
all other related actors, which can lead to aggregate change over time). 
166. See supra Section II.A. 
167. See supra Section II.B.3. 
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possession of marijuana does not change the fact that state marijuana 
legislation directly contradicts the CSA.168 Although state marijuana 
legislation is currently tolerated by the federal government, the 
legalization of marijuana still creates tensions that neither federalism, nor 
the Constitution, can adequately address alone.169  
The disparity between state and federal law is not all bad. 
Importantly, the confusion caused by state marijuana legislation can lead 
to positive social change if handled correctly. With that belief in mind, this 
Comment argues that states must utilize game theory to better understand 
complex social situations and to also identify effective solutions in the 
future. When used to evaluate state marijuana legislation, the effective use 
of game theory can lead to a better understanding of state and federal 
priorities, which in turn offers predictability and incentivizes interstate 
cooperation in the future.  
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game is also particularly relevant to this 
discussion because state marijuana legislation is a non-cooperative social 
situation that involves self-interested conduct, inadequate information, 
and a “zero-sum” mentality.170 The Prisoner’s Dilemma is also well-suited 
to address other complex interstate issues involving similar social and 
legal complexities.171 Ultimately, state marijuana legislation is not just 
about the legalization of marijuana.172 Instead, the use of marijuana raises 
a number of legal, political, social, economic, and medical interests that 
can either help or hurt modern American society.173 Thus, this Comment 
utilizes the Prisoner’s Dilemma to demonstrate that the current lack of 
cooperation between states must be improved in order to better address 
complex social issues in the future.174 
 
168. See supra Section II.B.2. 
169. See supra Sections II.A–.B; see also Angela Dills et al., Dose of Reality: The 
Effect of State Marijuana Legalizations, CATO INST. (Sept. 16, 2016), 
https://bit.ly/3b2Bjfn (discussing initial legislative predictions and how views have 
changed over time); Sarah Trumble & Nathan Kasai, America’s Marijuana Revolution, 
THIRD WAY (Aug. 24, 2017), https://bit.ly/3aV3RY7. 
170. See supra Section II.C.3; see also Kenton, supra note 27. 
171. See Stearns, supra note 53, at 6–7; see also Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the 
Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination, Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 210–
11 (2009) (arguing that “legal scholars are nearly obsessed with the Prisoners’ Dilemma, 
. . . [while] virtually ignoring other equally simple games offering equally sharp insights 
into legal problems.”). 
172. See Status Report, supra note 87. 
173. See Liberty Vittert, Opinion: Here’s what the numbers show about the impact 
of legal marijuana, MKT. WATCH (Apr. 19, 2019, 7:54 AM), https://on.mktw.net/2Ua1eeg; 
see also Judith Grisel, Pot Holes: Legalizing Marijuana is Fine, But Don’t ignore the 
Science on its Dangers, WASH. POST (May 25, 2018), https://wapo.st/2xJCj9X; Dan 
Hyman, When the Law Says Using Marijuana Is O.K., but the Boss Disagrees, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 19, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2WeBCzl. 
174. See supra Sections III.A–.B. 
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A. Modeling the Marijuana Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The regulation of marijuana is a source of significant social and legal 
disagreement between American citizens, state governments, federal law 
enforcement agencies, and even Congress.175 After years of federal 
criminalization, some state legislatures and even a few federal agencies, 
such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”), now recognize 
the potential benefits of marijuana in modern society.176 Additionally, 
rising public support for the medicinal and recreational use of marijuana 
suggests that both state and federal legalization is an inevitable reality at 
some point in the future.177 Accordingly, the question is not whether 
marijuana will become legal, but how and when a sweeping change will 
occur.178  
State marijuana legislation also illustrates the issues that can arise 
when states function as solitary creatures within an inherently federal 
system.179 More specifically, the fact that states often prioritize their 
individual goals to the detriment of neighboring states is concerning and 
often forecloses the possibility of social progress.180 Consequently, the 
application of game theory can help to address state marijuana legislation, 
as well as the need for progressive social change through informed 
decision-making and strategic cooperation amongst states.181 
1. General Assumptions  
To accurately assess state marijuana legislation using the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game, two preparatory steps are required. The first step is to 
identify the actors. The second step is to make general assumptions 
regarding each actor’s motivations and expected conduct.182 In this game, 
the first actor is a hypothetical state that supports the legal use of marijuana 
through state legislation (“State X”). The second actor is the local United 
States Attorney’s Office, which is overseen by a U.S. Attorney who will 
prosecute federal marijuana crimes in State X based on guidance from the 
 
175. See supra Section II.B. 
176. See State Marijuana Map, supra note 86; see also FDA Regulation of Cannabis 
and Cannabis-Derived Products, Including Cannabidiol (CBD), U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
AGENCY (Mar. 11, 2020), https://bit.ly/2Jbr2kR; Several marijuana-related bills pending 
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Attorney General. Both actors will also act rationally, despite having 
incomplete information about the motivations and actions of the other side. 
The next step is to determine the general motivations of each actor, 
including how each actor will attempt to satisfy their individual goals 
within the game. Because actual future conduct will be unknown, each 
party will presumptively act selfishly by seeking to achieve their 
respective goals without concern for the other side. This game will also 
assume that no marijuana legislation currently exists in State X, even 
though local citizens are supportive of laws that legalize the medicinal and 
recreational use of marijuana. 
The final step is to consider the expected conduct of each actor. In 
this example, State X is presumptively aware of the CSA, but the officials 
of State X also want to appease their citizens who support the legalization 
of marijuana. Similar to modern state legislatures, State X is unsure how 
to draft state legislation that will appease marijuana advocates, while also 
protecting disinterested citizens from harm. State X also knows that other 
states have passed marijuana-related legislation without adverse results, 
but also remains unsure if the local U.S. Attorney will pursue marijuana-
related crimes in the future.  
Alternatively, the U.S. Attorney is presumptively aware of State X’s 
plans to pass marijuana-related legislation in the future. Unbeknownst to 
State X, the U.S. Attorney also plans to enforce all federal laws in State X, 
including the CSA as discussed in the Sessions Memo.183 The U.S. 
Attorney also understands that if State X does indeed pass marijuana 
legislation, then he or she must decide how to properly allocate manpower 
to effectively prosecute marijuana-related activities in State X.  
2. Identifying the “Nash Equilibrium” 
Based on the assumptions mentioned, a Prisoner’s Dilemma exists 
because State X and the U.S. Attorney have conflicting goals and 
imperfect information regarding the plans of the other side.184 
Consequently, the critical next step is to determine the Nash Equilibrium, 
or the point at which both parties will have no incentive to deviate from 
their self-interested strategies.185 Notably, State X and the U.S. Attorney 
could work together to find a reasonable solution that would meet 
individual and collective needs. Unfortunately, cooperation is unlikely 
because State X is accountable to its citizens and the U.S. Attorney must 
follow the mandate of the Attorney General. If State X declines to pass 
marijuana legislation, voters would likely remove current state politicians 
from office. Similarly, the U.S. Attorney serves at the pleasure of the 
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Attorney General and could be removed from office for failing to follow 
the mandates set forth by the Attorney General.  
According to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, both actors will “betray” each 
other by prioritizing the goals of their relevant stakeholders without regard 
to the impact on the other side.186 Because the potential benefit of 
compromise is overshadowed by the need to satisfy respective 
stakeholders, State X will prioritize the desires of its citizens over the risk 
of potential litigation by the U.S. Attorney. Similarly, the U.S. Attorney 
will prioritize the enforcement of federal law by prosecuting marijuana-
related crimes until internal guidance is changed or until the CSA is 
modified. While the decisions of State X and the U.S. Attorney represent 
modern reality, neither approach is ideal. Additionally, the fact that 
cooperation is unlikely does not mean that a cooperative relationship 
cannot exist. 
B. Analyzing the Marijuana Prisoner’s Dilemma 
The Prisoner’s Dilemma game presumes that self-interest will prevail 
over cooperation.187 In fact, all game theory models rely on assumptions 
that may not completely reflect the realities of “real-life.”188 In non-
cooperative games, actors are presumed to make “rational” decisions that 
incentivize cooperation in specific circumstances.189 In reality, the 
decision to cooperate is often more complex and unpredictable than game 
theory suggests.190  
As previously mentioned, this Comment does not argue that game 
theory can predict naturally unpredictable human behavior. In fact, the 
popular belief that game theory can solve difficult problems in a matter of 
minutes is utterly false. Instead, this Comment argues that game theory 
can provide an enhanced understanding of real-life social issues that can 
lead to new or improved solutions.  
The hypothetical game between State X and the U.S. Attorney 
highlights the inherent unpredictability of human behavior, as well as the 
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need for certain assumptions.191 Even after careful preparation, this game 
cannot guarantee that actors will act rationally, nor can it ensure that 
expected outcomes will actually occur. Additionally, even if this game 
correctly predicts future conduct, there is no guarantee that the assumed 
motivations of the game are accurate. Consequently, the value of game 
theory is not in a perfect prediction of human behavior, but rather in the 
lessons gleaned from recurring models that offer both accurate and 
inaccurate results.192  
The hypothetical game discussed herein highlights two important 
realities of modern society.193 First, the existence of rationality does not 
necessarily stop actors from pursuing self-interested strategies, even when 
there is a high risk of unknown consequences. Second, game theory relies 
on assumptions and imperfect information, which means that even the best 
games cannot perfectly predict how parties will act, regardless of whether 
their interests align. In the hypothetical game discussed herein, both State 
X and the U.S. Attorney made decisions that supported the interests of 
their respective constituents. State X acted in a way that would likely 
appease voters, while the U.S. Attorney sought to appease the Attorney 
General. Each actor’s conduct also served deeper selfish interests. For 
example, State X knew that happy voters would re-elect current politicians 
to positions of power. Similarly, the U.S. Attorney sought to appease the 
Attorney General in order to retain his or her position of appointment. 
Although both actors shared similar goals, each actor still chose 
independent approaches rather than strategic collaboration. Even though 
the risk of potential failure could have been avoided through open 
communication and strategic collaboration, both actors still rationally 
chose to prioritize non-cooperative conduct in order to avoid limiting their 
potential payoffs. 
The purpose of the hypothetical game is to highlight the limitations 
of game theory and the potential insights that game theory can offer. Even 
in a controlled environment, the motivations of State X and the U.S. 
Attorney are merely theories based on past conduct and current research. 
Additionally, the game suggests that the potential benefits of cooperation 
are often insufficient to encourage parties to prioritize strategic 
cooperation.194 More broadly, the hypothetical demonstrates why game 
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theory should be embraced as a tool that, when used proactively, can 
increase understanding and potentially help avoid future issues before they 
arise.195  
C. Recommendations Moving Forward 
Game theory cannot force social change. In reality, game theory can 
provide an increased understanding of complex individuals and situations, 
in order to incentivize strategic cooperation among naturally selfish and 
uncooperative parties.196 Accordingly, the practical value of the Prisoner’s 
Dilemma and the Nash Equilibrium is to demonstrate how and why 
intentional cooperation can be used to achieve individual and collective 
goals.197 Although the complex nature of game theory can be daunting, 
true social change is not easy and cannot be achieved without significant 
preparation.198 Similarly, a basic awareness of game theory will not offer 
lasting solutions to complex social issues.199  
In addition to preparation, states must also continue to act as 
“laboratories” of democracy, while also identifying interstate 
collaborative opportunities that will help to achieve individual and 
collective goals.200 Additionally, two more-specific recommendations 
should also be considered. First, federal and state legislators should 
communicate with one another to discuss how legislation affects local 
communities, states, and the nation. The distinction between state and 
federal law is not an impenetrable barrier. The Constitution also 
intrinsically ties independent governments together, which in turn implies 
that cooperation is sensible for both practical and political reasons. 
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Although state and federal collaboration may not change the priorities of 
Congress or current federal laws like the CSA, cooperation can lead to 
productive conversations that refocus political efforts on the social issues 
most pressing to the public majority.  
Second, an interstate task force should be established to discuss 
cross-border social issues, especially topics involving differing state and 
federal laws. Involvement of the federal government should be considered, 
but is not necessarily required. The interstate task force should focus on a 
wide range of social issues that present current issues and future 
cooperative opportunities amongst diverse states. Above all, the interstate 
task force should be more than an academic body by attempting to resolve 
specific social issues that will, in turn, eventually allow states to reclaim 
basic rights and promised constitutional powers under the Tenth 
Amendment.  
III. CONCLUSION 
Game theory is a powerful tool, whose value can vary based upon the 
preparation and skill of the user. When properly applied to complex social 
situations, game theory can offer valuable insights into party motivations 
and potential future conduct.201 Game theory can also help to explain why 
parties make non-cooperative decisions, which in turn can be used to 
employ strategies that avoid such an unnecessary result. 
Game theory is also applicable to various facets of modern society. 
Game theory can develop and incentivize informed decision-making, 
including the desire to cooperate with diverse parties. This benefit is 
especially important in social situations where parties often fall prey to 
selfish, independent acts resulting in a Nash Equilibrium. Game theory can 
also increase social understanding, which in turn can mitigate the tensions 
posed by federalism and also promote interstate cooperation in the future. 
While there is no simple solution to address the tensions and uncertainties 
caused by state marijuana legislation, resolutions do exist if states are 
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